The Story Behind the $3.2B Acquisition of Segment - from the Co-Founder’s & CFO’s Perspective

Intro 00:01
Welcome to Startup Success. The podcast for startup founders and investors here, you’ll find stories of success from others in the trenches as they work to scale some of the fastest growing startups in the world, stories that will help you in your own journey. Startup Success starts now.

Kate 00:18
Welcome to Startup Success today is a very special episode, because it’s our 100th episode and we have two really important guests in studio. First of all, we have Peter Reinhardt, who is the CEO and co-founder of Charm Industrial. And then we have Jeff Burkland, who is the CEO and founder of Burkland, who sponsors this show. And it’s going to be a great conversation, because we’re going to talk to Peter about what he’s doing at Charm, but first we’re going to explore where Peter and Jeff worked together at Segment. So Segment was a startup that Peter founded prior to Charm, and as I’m sure everybody listening knows, it was acquired by Twilio for 3.2 billion. But you might not know that Jeff was the fractional CFO working with Peter at Segment, so this will be a fun conversation. Welcome Peter and Jeff. Thank you both for being here.

Peter Reinhardt 01:24
Thanks for having me.

Jeff Burkland 01:25
Thank you.

Kate 01:26
Thank you. So Peter before we get started, if you wouldn’t mind giving a brief overview of your background and what led to the founding of Segment. Everyone always enjoys those founding inspiration tidbits.

Peter Reinhardt 01:43
Yeah, yeah. I was studying aerospace engineering at MIT, and I got interested and started reading on Hacker News, you know, Paul Graham’s essays on how to start a startup. And otherwise I was going to go off into like, big government. That’s what the aerospace industry is basically. And so me and my roommates, Calvin and Ilya, got really excited about starting a company. We took this class called founder’s journey. Got even more amped, and kind of realized that this was, like, an accessible thing, because every week, you just met a new founder in person. And we’re like, Okay, well, like, this is a thing we can do. And so we got into Y Combinator in the summer of 2011. We failed really hard for, like, a year and a half to find product-market fit like. We built a classroom, lecture tool. We built an analytics tool. Neither of these things found product-market fit. And finally, my co-founder, fourth co-founder, Ian, who we picked up from Rhode Island School Design, was like, you know, I think this little open source library called analytics js, I think it has value, and I think people will be excited about it, and we should build a product around it. And I remember thinking like, this is literally the worst idea I’ve ever heard. It’s a 300 line piece of JavaScript. It’s already open source on GitHub. Like, I don’t understand how you turn it into a company, even if it’s something that people want. And so I tried to kill it, and I was like, we should launch this on Hacker News. You’ll see that it’s not popular, right? That’s the subtext. So we launched it on Hacker News. It went straight to the top. Got like, 1000s of stars on GitHub, 1000s of email signups. It was crazy. It just blew up. And people also were very clear that they didn’t want an open source version. They wanted a hosted version. They wanted a service that would allow their marketers to send data wherever they wanted by clicking a button. And so we got really lucky, actually, that the open source library gave people the idea for what the product could be, but didn’t actually fulfill the need. And that was the birth of Segment.

Kate 03:34
Wow. Okay, I appreciate you being so candid and sharing that you floundered a bit there for a while with product-market fit, because I don’t think anyone knew that or would assume that. And then the fact that you didn’t think it was going to work, and that it was listening to potential users about, you know, making it more of a product.

Peter Reinhardt 03:56
It was pretty rough, to be clear. Like we were a year and a half in, I think we had six months of runway left. We were basically on ramen. I was in and out of the hospital for panic attacks. It was bad. And then we got very lucky.

Jeff Burkland 04:10
I would add one of the things that became clear as I was working with Segment, I heard the story a few times from Peter and from some of the other co-founders. You know, everybody you know, has this perception that you see these successful companies, right? The saying overnight success many years in the making, is so true. I mean, Segment did really well once it found that product-market, right? But to understand the story behind it, there’s a lot of tough stuff that went on before that. It’s an amazing story to hear.

Kate 04:39
I wouldn’t have guessed that, I’ll be honest, but it’s actually encouraging to hear for people right now who are going through those early days, right? And kind of the pivots you made and listening to feedback.

Peter Reinhardt 04:52
Yeah and like, the, the worst part is it is grueling knowing that no one cares, actually, right? So that year and a half where you’re searching for product-market fit, the fundamental thing is, like nobody cares. If you disappeared, nobody cares. And the flip side is, once we found product-market fit, the feeling changed pretty drastically. It actually felt like a loss of control, right? Because what happened is customers started demanding stuff, and our vision no longer really mattered, right? It was like we clearly didn’t have great intuitions for what customers wanted, so we’ve kind of just started following whatever it was that they were asking for. And it was the sense of loss of control that like people were going to show up and start using it in ways that we didn’t expect or or think about, they were going to ask for things that we hadn’t previously kind of considered in the vision. And so the next six months really felt like, oddly, a sense of loss, in the sense of loss of control.

Kate 05:44
Yeah, I can see that. We just had an AI founder on here recently, and same thing, like the customers were dictating where the product was going, and we just kind of gave in and went with what they were telling us they needed. (As it should be – very exciting.) You’ll definitely find product-market fit that way. So tell us, okay, early days, you found this product-market fit, I’m guessing you had a successful fundraising round, and maybe Jeff you can help and jump in here. When Jeff came in, when you started to put more of a structure around the company, knowing you needed a fractional CFO.

Peter Reinhardt 06:21
Was it before or after the Series Seed that you started, Jeff?

Jeff Burkland 06:24
I think it was a little after the Seed. So I was either the 10th or 11th person that came into the company.

Kate 06:32
Oh, wow. Okay, so earlier than I … Okay, that’s good to know.

Jeff Burkland 06:38
I’ll say what we were talking about at the time. I remember Peter, I believe, was not totally sure you needed a part time CFO, and one of your questions was, What am I going to miss if I don’t hire you? What’s going to be the problem? Which I thought was a really, really good question. I hadn’t been asked that before. The brief version of the answer was, You won’t be able to see around corners, and you’ll get surprised at some point in time, like something the board will ask you’ll be like on your back feet. You won’t really understand what’s coming from the financials. That was the short version of that answer. I’m not sure if you remember anything different. Peter.

Peter Reinhardt 07:17
Yeah, that sounds right to me. I think I have one thing to add to it, though, which is, when we went out to raise the Series Seed, I think we had about four weeks of runway left, and I hadn’t really thought about how long it takes to close a priced round. And so it ended up being a little more spicy than it needed to be, but we ended up getting pretty good terms on, like, you know, 2 million in money into the company. We called the Series Seed because it was the first priced round, but it was small, even though it was really the second Seed round. And then after that, it was clear that our biggest problem was sales. And so I was really struggling with sales. We hired our first salesperson, Rafael, who did an incredible job getting us our first sales. And I think it was around that time that we were getting our very first sales, and I was like, Oh boy, now we have to start thinking about invoicing and whatever. Everything’s getting a little bit more complicated than I personally want to deal with. And I think that’s when I was like, Okay, maybe we should start thinking about, you know, having a professional CFO. And I think I actually wrote up a lot of the lessons from these early years just learning from Jeff around finance on my blog, https://rein.pk, and I think they’ve been reposted a bunch of times to Hacker News of just like, my learnings at the time on accounting, and my learnings at the time on FP&A, or, like, Strategic Finance. And I remember one of the most impactful things at some point, Jeff, you showed me this model where you were like, hey, you know, if we ask for like, a little more prepayment on our contracts, your burn rate is going to, like, cut half. And I was like, what? And you showed me the model, it was like, a play with the prepaid percentage. And it was insane the impact on burn just from, like, a relatively seemingly minor term as pay now or pay 12 months, who cares. Or monthly to prepaid annual was like insane burn differential. And I think other companies have been very sophisticated on this, like AppDynamics, I think did, like, three years prepaid, and it drastically reduced their burn. And so anyways, that maybe is, like a tactical example of what then came out of that, like, what will I miss? Like, shitload of burn from a financial term in a contract, right?

Jeff Burkland 09:13
Yeah, I remember that Peter, that was, that was fun. I remember I was putting that little model together. It was a really, really simple model based on Segment data. And I knew it intuitively, but even until I saw it on a chart like the monthly, if you collect monthly, it was, you know, this clear chart, way below zero in terms of cash, and then quarterly, bi annual, once every six months. Not all of them were below. And then annual suggested we could never need to raise again. You know, of course, things change, but just that dramatic of a difference, I remember that too. That was pretty, pretty fun.

Peter Reinhardt 09:49
Crazy. I think I walked straight to the sales team, and I was like, all annual prepaid now.

Jeff Burkland 09:56
Okay, nothing other than annual prepay. And then. That’s what happened actually.

Peter Reinhardt 10:01
It was crazy. Yeah, it’s crazy because enterprises don’t care.

Kate 10:05
That is a great example. (laughing) Jeff, do you remember any others that you helped with?

Jeff Burkland 10:14
You know, I’ll build on that. Hopefully it’s okay to share this. But that annual prepaid was a very interesting thing, because then all of a sudden, all the contracts were handled prepaid, until there became a point when, all of a sudden, we were giving in on that. And I started to notice we were getting quarterlies. Something was going on. And I was also walking around the company and sort of asking questions, and I noticed that we were kind of falling behind in a couple areas, and the intelligence that came from noticing these no longer seeming to have the same kind of negotiating power to get annual prepay seemed a piece of an indicator that there were a couple areas that we needed to work on which then facilitated some conversation. I’m sure Peter was having other conversations as well, but that enabled me to sort of add into that. Seeing what I was seeing.

Peter Reinhardt 11:02
Yeah, I’m curious which one it was. There were a couple product gaps that emerged and then we closed over the years. But one was we launched this really cool feature called Redshift Integration, where you could basically just take everyone’s streaming web and mobile data, load it into their data warehouse immediately. And that thing sold like hotcakes, and then it kind of got commoditized as a standalone feature, and that became a product gap, or a pricing and packaging gap, which required some fixing. And then the other one was mobile. Specifically, we had a competitor called mParticle that came out of New York, and really was mostly marketing a difference around mobile, but there were a few small product gaps that they like leveraged the crap out of. And so then we did like, a three month sprint, and we just, like, slammed the door shut on those, on those product gaps. Do remember which one of those it was that you noticed in the prepayments?

Jeff Burkland 11:49
You know, it’s funny what the memory does – I actually don’t remember the exact product. But what I recall is it was one of the first major releases that we were doing, and it got delayed. And then it got delayed, like, at the last minute. And I was like, Oh, that’s not good. And then I coupled it with this intelligence about how we weren’t getting quite the same negotiating power. And plus some other conversations. It was interesting.

Kate 12:11
That is super interesting. I mean, it sounds stressful, but also fun to be iterating like that, right?

Peter Reinhardt 12:17
Sure, like, a little more existential in the moment. With the power of hindsight, it was fun.

Kate 12:20
I was just gonna say hindsight, the power of hindsight. That’s what it is, exactly. So, Jeff, how long were you a part of Segment? Do you remember?

Jeff Burkland 12:30
I think it was something like about three years, something on that order. More than two, I’m pretty sure. And definitely less than four. It was a while.

Peter Reinhardt 12:42
It was like 10 to 50 employees, 10 to 75, something like that.

Jeff Burkland 12:45
Well, actually, it might have been pushing a little above 100, but it was something on that order.

Peter Reinhardt 12:53
Yeah, my memory is that at some point the accounting load got too heavy, or, like it wasn’t cost effective to continue having accounting outsourced. And so I believe we brought in a really amazing controller, which you helped hire. That’s my memory. And then that kind of shifted a lot of the tactical load, and you shifted to more kind of like strategic advice, maybe for like, 50 to 100 and then you phased out after that.

Jeff Burkland 13:16
That’s exactly right. That’s exactly right. And if you want, we could just jump to that, Kate.

Kate 13:19
Yeah, I think that would be helpful.

Jeff Burkland 13:23
So when it came time to phase out, what happened was exactly as Peter said, we kind of did the analysis and decided that it made the most sense to build off the accounting team first before I left. And that was because we were, you know, we had it in mind of going to IPO, like several years away. But because of that, we wanted to bring in a really great controller to help prep that direction. And so we hired a full time controller, who worked for Segment. W2’ed for Segment, but reported to me. I was probably working about 50% time. And then built out the accounting function, like Peter said. Got that set. And I focused more strategically, but then eventually what happened was the company got big enough where even though I was a little over 50% time, I just couldn’t keep in touch with everything enough. They really needed a full time person in there that was getting full time insight about the company, and I just wasn’t fully able to gain that insight. We had to think about whether or not we limped along with me in the sort of not 100% capable state and maybe raise another round before hiring somebody that would be that much better, or whether or not, you know, we needed to make a shift. And what made sense was to shift to somebody that was full time at the company.

Kate 14:45
I mean, that makes a lot of sense, right? There’s a certain you know, number of employees, you’re kind of at a point where you need somebody like, you said, 100%.

Jeff Burkland 14:56
Yeah, because you just get so much more insight. Like, I could keep up with it for a long time when the company was small. I knew what that was about. But then the company gets big enough, and even being there half time, I just wasn’t getting enough insight into the company.

Kate 15:09
So you were there, Jeff, for some pretty important years, for those three years. Anything else you can share that you worked on that really stands out?

Jeff Burkland 15:22
I’ll say something. I’m not sure if Peter, I’m sure has other things, but, I want to say a couple things that I felt like Peter did really well. And that I think are great for CEOs to learn. You know, one was, there are a lot of things he did well, just being honest, and I’m not just blowing smoke. One memory was how he approached a mistake that I made on my part. And, you know, the HR person had a little bit of a role there too, but we both made a mistake. It wasn’t a minor mistake. It wasn’t deadly to the company, but it was real. And I remember Peter asked, if you know the HR person and I would do a debrief with him on it. We did that. We prepped for it.

Peter Reinhardt 16:07
I don’t even remember what this was.

Jeff Burkland 16:09
I think it had to do with equity and like some equity issuances. I think we right-sized it, but I think it had something to do with that. And I remember, you know, like I said, we prepped. And then I remember, in the meeting with you, we were very comfortable admitting where we messed up. It was hard because it was real, you know, and we shouldn’t have made the mistake, but mistakes happen. I remember we talked about suggestions, and I remember you were really supportive through the whole thing. You took it seriously, as you should, but you weren’t accusatory like coming down on anybody. And by the way, as a reference, this is when you were in your late 20s. Like I don’t think I could have done that in my late 20s. (Peter: I think it was in my early 20s). Yeah. I was impressed. That was the right way to do it. Now if I’d have done that over and over again, that would be a different story. But I think that was my only one.

Peter Reinhardt 17:19
My memory was there was another big strategic impact that you and Sandy, our HR advisor had had together. I remember I was walking down the hall at our Potrero Hill office, and the two you kind of just like, confronted me in the hallway, and you’re like, into the conference room. I was like, okay. Then you’re like, people don’t know what the goals are. This was at the point in time where we were seeing that commoditization on the Redshift Integration that I mentioned before. And so we were actually seeing declining revenue that month, and maybe two months in a row, which was terrifying. The worst case scenario for a startup is declining revenue. And I think our goal had been to go from 10 to 20 million ARR that year, and we had gone to like, 12 or 13, and we were sinking back towards 12 towards the middle of the year. It was looking very bad for getting to a 20 million ARR target. And so I was in a very stressed out situation. And anyways, Jeff and Sandy, like, pulled me into a room, and they were like, nobody knows what the goals are. So I was like, what do you mean? Everyone knows what the goals are. Like, nope. No one knows. I was like, that can’t be right. They’re like, why don’t you go ask everybody what the goals are. And I don’t remember if I walked out or if I was just like, okay, you guys are serious. But at any rate, it became clear that, like, people did not know what the goals were because we weren’t reinforcing them on any kind of regular basis. We didn’t say “these are the four goals” at every all-hands. Like, shout it out, you know? And they were like, why don’t you write them down? So I wrote them up on the board, and they’re like, it’s great that they’re clear in your head, but people don’t know. And why aren’t you sharing those goals? And one of the goals was like, basically unfuck the pricing and packaging on Redshift, so that we wouldn’t have this loss of revenue anymore. And they’re like, well, why aren’t you broadcasting that goal so that people can work on it? And I’m like, oh, it’s too hard and it’s too scary. I don’t want people to feel that the business is in a tight spot. And I remember you guys were like, people know the business is in a tight spot, you don’t have to tell them, but by not sharing the goal, you’re making it so only you can work on it, and you’re a bottleneck and it’s not going to work. And so, like, what you have to do is you have to get up in front of the company. Say it’s a crisis and that you need to solve this, and name the people who are going to solve it in the company, and it can’t be you. And I was like, Whoa. This felt very backwards, I don’t know if I can do that. And whatever. I got up and I did it at the all-hands the next week, and I was terrified that everyone was going to quit or something, right? And it’s totally the opposite of what happened. Everyone rallied, right? Everyone was like, awesome, now there’s a high impact thing I can help rescue the company. And in particular, I had to ask this one engineering team focused on pricing and packaging to accelerate a project and basically do it in like four days over the weekend, I think, and ship it by Monday, instead of it being like a four month project. And I felt like a total jackass asking them to do it, and then they rallied, they shipped it. We fixed the pricing and packaging issues, and sales also picked up performance a lot, and we hit 20 million at the end of the year, at like 11:30pm or something, when a contract came in from Asia. And it was insane. It was the best day for everyone on the team. But the thing that really stuck out to me, actually, is at the end of the Segment journey, when we got acquired, my co-founders and I called up as many people as we could and asked, What was your favorite memory at Segment? And the people who were on that team said that their favorite memory from the entire journey at Segment was the day that we asked them to deliver that pricing and packaging on a super short time frame to save the company. And that, like, blew my mind. It makes sense when it’s kind of stated this way, but in the moment where you’re like, ‘the company is hosed’ that that was actually their favorite moment, was getting to be the heroes and rescue it. So it makes sense in retrospect, but it did not feel right at the time to do it. And I think it was very good strategic advice on how to convert a financial problem into, like, a set of goals that a company can actually act on.

Kate 21:23
Thank you for sharing that. It’s a really compelling story. And also, like what I heard in that is you had a team you trusted around you, and you listened to them, right? Not very many founders do that – take that leap that you did.

Jeff Burkland 21:39
This is true. This is another strength of Peter’s. He was really good at hearing feedback and learning and listening. I remember observing that and not always agreeing. That’s fine, you know. There were definitely times I could sense he didn’t agree, and we had those conversations. But yeah, he was, he was good at listening, hearing feedback, adjusting.

Kate 21:59
It’s important, and I don’t think very many founders have that ability. I think we all know some.

Peter Reinhardt 22:06
I think it’s a do or die thing. The company dies if you don’t get better.

Jeff Burkland 21:10
Exactly, yeah.

Kate 22:11
Very true. We only have a few minutes left, and I want to talk about Charm Industrial. Is there anything else that I mean you both have given us so much. I think that people listening, just how candid you both were and what really happened at Segment is super interesting and inspiring. Anything else you want to share before we move on to Charm?

Jeff Burkland 22:36
I’ll share one brief thing. Something I loved at Segment was Peter’s ability to take something that’s really complex, and like what Segment did, took me six months to understand after starting. And he’d take this complex thing and he’d put it into, in a fundraise pitch, something that had very few words. Like he could espouse the vision so well, and not just that. I think some of the best fundraising pitches have exceedingly little words and can get the point across. And that’s something I would encourage founders to learn as well.

Kate 23:16
That’s really good advice, Peter, do you feel like, I mean, do you remember that, that you were able to explain it, because what Segment did is very complicated. I understand it because I’m in marketing, but when I try to explain so many people are like what. (laughing)

Peter Reinhardt 23:29
I can’t tell whether I’m cursed with complicated businesses, or I’m bad at explaining them.

Jeff Burkland 23:38
No, you’re good at explaining them.

Peter Reinhardt 23:39
If I assume that I’m cursed with complex businesses, then I guess I’m good at explaining them. (Jeff: Yeah, you’re definitely good at explaining.) I should probably do simpler businesses.

Kate 23:48
No, no. That is actually you teed it up perfectly, because when I started researching Charm Industrial, I was shocked. You’re in a completely different area, and it’s so cool, but very complicated. So please showcase what Jeff just said you’re good at, give us the rundown on Charm. It’s so neat.

Peter Reinhardt 24:11
Sure, yeah. So the fundamental problem that Charm is trying to solve is we’ve got too much CO2 in the atmosphere, right? We all know that that’s what’s driving global warming, climate change and so on. And you have a lot of companies who want to get to net zero. They want to get to net zero amount of CO2 going into the atmosphere every year. And they can reduce their emissions to some extent, and that’s what they should and do prioritize first. Buying clean power, you know, changing out beef for chicken on the menu, etc. Like I did all those things at Segment as well. And then you have some stuff that you can’t get rid of today, like flying salespeople around. Even if you buy sustainable aviation fuel, that’s only going to cut your emissions by like 20%. So, there are some things that you can’t reduce. You’ve got CO2 going into the atmosphere. And what those companies really want to buy, it turns out, is a carbon removal. It’s what I also wanted to buy. That’s how I discovered this as I was a buyer. And I was trying to buy a carbon remover. I wanted to pay someone to go take that carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere and get rid of it. And the problem in 2016 when I started looking into this, is that all of the existing things at the time were basically garbage. They would claim to be removing the CO2, and in fact, would not be, or the vast majority would not. So that was clear as a buyer, but now that, like the academic research has caught up on this point. So like out of Berkeley, for example, it’s about 97% of all the carbon offsets sold don’t do anything from a carbon perspective. They might do good things for ecosystems, and, you know, in some cases, might put money into third world hands, and so on, but they’re very ineffective at carbon. And that was very frustrating and very disappointing to learn. And so I was like, Okay, what would be a good carbon removal asset? What would be a good way that we could permanently, measurably remove carbon from the atmosphere. What we eventually found at Charm is a process where carbon dioxide is already captured by plants, and then a lot of those plants actually rot or burn every year, right? Like you grow, we grow 100 million acres of corn, and then we let it rot, and all that CO2 goes back, all the hundreds of millions of tons of CO2 goes straight back into the atmosphere every year. Like what a shame. We already did the hard work of capturing it, but then we just kind of let it kind of let it pass through our fingers. Similarly, for forests, we have massive forest fires in the West, all over the world, Canada, US West, et cetera. And that’s already CO2 that’s been captured from the atmosphere. We actually have huge fuel load reduction projects. US Forest Service and State Forest Services and so on, go to huge efforts to do fuel load reduction, where they go in and they cut all the ladder fuels. They have miles long piles of logs that they don’t know what to do with, that are all unmerchantable timber. So there’s all this biomass that’s been captured, and then we let it go back into the atmosphere. So the idea is that we take that biomass that is otherwise going to rot or burn, and we cook it into a liquid, and then we inject that liquid into old oil wells, and then the carbon dioxide in the plants is in a liquid and permanently stored underground. And the weirdest thing about this liquid is it’s actually the active taste ingredient in barbecue sauce. (Kate: What?) Yes, if you take the liquid smoke or natural smoke flavor. If, next time you have barbecue sauce, look on the back and you’ll see one of those two. And it’s the watery part of the Bio Oil that we make. So you’ve eaten it before. And, yeah, we get these old oil wells that are abandoned assets. You know, they were making money for the landowners at one point, but they’re not anymore. They often have environmental issues surrounding them because, in many cases, they have been orphaned and left behind residues or leaking methane or things like that. So we clean that up and start putting carbon back where it came from.

Kate 27:52
That is so cool. I mean, that’s just and you explained it very well. So thank you. Jeff’s right. But wow, that must feel so good to be working on this.

Peter Reinhardt 28:04
Yeah, yeah, it’s fun. One, like the mission matters a lot. And frankly, the mission of doing something good for the climate and the people who will be affected by climate change is a lot more meaningful to me than marketing technology. As good of a business as Segment was, and as much as I learned along the way, and as much as I love the people I didn’t really care that much about the mission, right? And now I get all of the above, which is wonderful. And then also just hardware – software drove me crazy. Like my background was aerospace engineering, right? Just like I understand we’re flipping bits somewhere, but I can’t see it. I love being able to actually see the real impact in the real world of what we’re doing.

Kate 28:43
I can imagine that, you know, you learned a lot at Segment that you can now take into this, you know, company that you’re right, the mission is so motivating, that’s kind of like it all came together.

Peter Reinhardt 28:55
Yeah, for sure. I mean, a lot of things are the same – finance, management, recruiting, sales, marketing, it is a lot of the same. Hardware engineering, I would say, is a little different. Physical operations with an hourly, hourly team is like, pretty different. It’s a lot of fun. Prepay is the same.

Kate 29:12
Okay? Well, there we go, Jeff, there you go. Good.

Peter Reinhardt 29:17
You fight for the prepay.

Kate 29:19
I love it. Well, I could talk to you both for hours about everything that transpired at your time during Segment, but these two do not have that kind of time, so I have to let them go, unfortunately. But thank you both for being here. It was fascinating. I know everybody listening learned a lot. Peter, all the best with Charm. That’s fascinating. And I think we all want you to succeed, continue to succeed. For those listening that want to learn more about Charm, where should they go?

Peter Reinhardt 29:51
CharmIndustrial.com

Kate 29:52
Great, great. Okay, well, thank you both again. It was a really fun and insightful conversation.

Jeff Burkland 29:59
It was awesome. Thank you.

Peter Reinhardt 30:01
Thanks for having us.

Intro 30:02
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